Introduction
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the analysis of tax incidence in Africa (Younger, et.al., 1999; Alderman and del Ninno, 1999; Sahn and Younger, 1998) . In part, this is motivated by the obvious need for tax reform in Africa, where revenues are small as a share of GDP (outside the economies with large mineral royalties) and the tax system is often highly distortionary, relying excessively on trade taxes and narrow commodity excises. Yet with every reform comes the concern of how a policy change will affect the distribution of income, and in particular, how poorer households will fare.
All of the newer literature on tax incidence relies on nationally representative household survey data. Surveys of this type are increasingly available in Africa, and they provide an attractive new source of data. Nevertheless, they have their limits for tax analysis, particularly for taxes on intermediate consumption. Existing studies either restrict themselves to taxes on final demand (Alderman and del Ninno, 1999) or make strong assumptions about the incidence of taxes on inputs (Younger, et.al., 1999; Sahn and Younger, 1998) .
Our aim in this paper is to follow up on the existing tax incidence study for Madagascar by Younger, Sahn, Haggblade, and Dorosh (YSHD, 1999) with a different set of methodological assumptions. In particular, rather than making use of only households' pattern of demand in the analysis, we also employ an input-output table for Madagascar. This permits us to trace an indirect tax levied on intermediate products through the I-O table to final consumers. This approach is particularly important for analysis of import duties and petroleum taxes. Two-thirds of imports to Madagascar are intermediate goods, as is about 80 percent of petroleum consumption. Clearly, taking some account of the indirect impact of taxes on these goods and services is important to understand their incidence.
To see the importance, and also some limitations, of this new approach, we calculate the incidence of several taxes in Madagascar, making use of the I-O table. We then compare these results to the ones in YSHD, allowing us to see the importance of our methodological changes.
Methods
Our main purpose is to calculate the incidence of different taxes in Madagascar. In general terms, a tax transfers real purchasing power from households to the government. The "incidence" of the tax refers to whose real purchasing power falls when the government imposes that tax. Taxes are said to be progressive if poorer households pay a proportionately smaller share of the tax than wealthy households, relative to some measure of overall welfare, usually income or expenditures. Taxes are regressive if the opposite is true, and neutral if the tax shares are equal to overall income/expenditure shares. As in YSHD, we use household expenditure (per capita) rather than income as our welfare measure, so that we will concern ourselves with the incidence of taxes across the per capita expenditure distribution.
Assigning Taxes Paid to Households
Previous studies of tax incidence in Africa assign taxes paid based on the observed pattern of demand for taxed goods. YSHD calculate each household's tax paid by multiplying the statutory tax rate times the amount of the good that the household consumes. Alderman and del Ninno make a similar calculation for VAT rates in South Africa. This method is an accurate first-order approximation of the incidence for taxes on final consumption such as a VAT or excise duties on consumer goods like alcohol and cigarettes (Ahmad and Stern, 1991, for example), but presents clear problems for taxes on intermediate goods. YSHD assume that an import duty on good x raises the price of imported and domestic prices for final consumption of good x by the amount of the tax, ignoring any impact of import duties on intermediate products.
They make a similar assumption for petroleum imports, although they also make an ad hoc attempt to compensate for the indirect effects by including 20 percent of passenger transport services in the petroleum tax base.
In this study, we will take a different approach to taxes that fall heavily on intermediate inputs by making use of an input-output (I-O) part of petroleum duties falls on passenger transport, and also on most other goods that require transport as an input. We then calculate the incidence of the tax as the sum of the direct and indirect effects of the tax, i.e. we consider both price increases in the product itself and in all other products that use it in their production.
Formally, we use the following model of price formation for domestic production:
where P j is the price of goods in industry j, a ij is the technical coefficient from the I-O table for domestic inputs from industry i to industry j, t j d is the VAT rate for domestic value-added in industry j, t j m is the VAT rate for imports in industry j, d j is the import tariff rate for goods in industry j, , a ij is the technical coefficient from the I-O table for imported inputs from industry i to industry j, and s j is the tax rate for various turnover-type taxes on domestic production. We assume that the VAT on imported goods is applied to the post-duty price, which is the practice in Madagascar. We also assume that each good may use different combinations of imported and domestic goods in production, which is consistent with the I-O table that we use.
We can write the set of price equations for all industries in matrix form and solve it for a reduced form set of price equations. In matrix notation:
where the unsubscripted variables are matrices corresponding to the variables above. Note that where all elasticities are assumed to be zero. While a more elaborate model would be preferable, these assumptions provide a first-order approximation of the incidence of small policy changes.
To judge the incidence of a tax, we recalculate prices according to equation (2), but with a vector of zeros substituted for the original taxes in question. The difference between the two price calculations is the tax paid by consumers. Of course, most of the industries in the I-O table include imports as well as domestically produced goods. To capture the direct effect of taxes on imports, we simply multiply the tax rate times the amount of imports. We then add these two components together, dividing by total supply of the industry to get a "tax rate". As an example, consider the effect of import duties on the cost of domestic supply:
P 0 is the price of domestic production in the absence of import duties, calculated using equation
(2). Imposing import duties raises prices of domestic goods to P, and the final impact of the price that consumers pay is the difference between the two. That is the indirect effect. In addition, the direct effect raises the cost of imported final goods by the change in the duty rate,
, times the value of imports, increased by the VAT. We then scale this by total supply, X, to get an estimate of the "tax rate" that includes both direct and indirect effects. The calculation for a purely domestic tax, such as the turnover-type taxes, includes only the first term in the numerator.
Comparing the Incidence of Different Taxes
Once we establish the tax rates Z in equation (3), we then apply them to observed consumption of households in the 1994 Enquete Permanente aupres des Menages (EPM), a nationally representative household income and expenditure survey. This requires a mapping of each expenditure item in the survey to the industries in the I-O table, which we provide in Appendix I. We then compare the incidence of different taxes using concentration curves (Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991) . Concentration curves are diagrams which are similar to Lorenz curves 2 in that they plot households from the poorest to the wealthiest on the horizontal axis against the cumulative proportion of taxes paid for all households from the poorest up to household n. Yitzhaki and Slemrod prove that for any social welfare function that favors an equitable distribution of income, changing the tax structure by slightly reducing taxes on good x and increasing those on good y by just enough to keep total revenues constant will improve social welfare when x's concentration curve is everywhere below y's. In this case, we say that x dominates y. The intuition is straightforward. If poorer households tend to consume less of a particular good, say gasoline, and more of another, say food, then reducing taxes on the latter and raising those on the former will improve the distribution of welfare. Yitzhaki and Slemrod refer to this as "welfare dominance" because of the analogy with the concept of second order stochastic dominance in the finance literature. The concentration curve for food is above that for gasoline because poorer households account for a larger share of total food consumption than they do for gasoline consumption.
In addition to comparing the concentration curves for different taxes, it is also insightful to compare each tax's concentration curve to two benchmarks: the Lorenz curve for expenditures and the 45 degree line. It is standard in the tax literature to say that a tax is progressive if it falls proportionately less on poorer households and more on wealthy ones, relative to their expenditures, and regressive if it does not. Thus, a tax whose concentration curve is below the Lorenz curve for expenditures is progressive, and vice-versa. As the tax's concentration curve approaches the 45-degree line, it becomes extremely regressive, as in a head tax.
In all cases, we make the comparisons statistically. We use a distribution-free estimator of the standard errors of a set of ordinates on each curve to test the null that the ordinates for each curve are the same (Davidson and Duclos, 1997) . Following Howes (1996) , we reject the null hypothesis of non-dominance only if the tests at each ordinate differ significantly and are of the same sign. We also reject the null in favor of crossing concentration curves if there are two or more significant t-statistics with opposite signs.
Choosing Tax Rates
In addition to using the I-O table to calculate indirect effects, we have varied from the methods in YSHD by using information in the I-O table to calculate tax rates rather than using the statutory rates. This means that our results may differ from those in YSHD for two reasons:
we account for indirect effects, and we use different, more realistic, tax rates in our calculations.
In particular, we calculate the diagonal elements of T d as the total domestic VAT revenues per industry divided by the industry's value-added. The diagonal elements of T m are the total VAT revenues from imports per industry divided by the industry's imports (after duties). The diagonal elements of S are total "taxes on producers" divided by the value of domestic output. (This includes a mixture of property taxes on firms, local market taxes, and some specific excise duties, most importantly on alcohol and tobacco.) Finally, we calculate D as the total value of import duties per industry divided by the total value of imports (cif). Petroleum excises, the taxe unique sur produits petroliers (TUPP), are included in this vector, as they are levied only as petroleum products pass through the port. This is the only tax on petroleum products, and we assume that the entire value of this element of D is due to the TUPP. Similarly, but less precisely, we assume that the entire value of producer taxes for the beverage and tobacco industries are excises on those products.
A Caution
While the methods that we use in this paper may seem to be obviously superior to those in YSHD, there is one important caution. The I-O table that we use contains only 30 industries, while the expenditure survey has considerable more detail, 222 separate consumption items.
Thus, to move from the YSHD approach to the methods we use here, we must aggregate commodities to a considerable extent. Such aggregation will err when the several goods in a category have much different tax rates, because the IO-based analysis must treat all items within an industry as if they had the same rate. We will show an example of this problem in the following section.
Results

Applicable tax rates under different methods
Before considering the incidence results, it is useful to examine the different tax rates that we apply to households' consumption. Table 1 gives the average statutory rates used in YSHD, an average "actual" rate derived from the national income accounts, and an "effective IO" rate derived from the IO table. To calculate the average statutory rates, we first assumed that the official tax rates applied, but only to products that YSHD judged to be in the formal sector and thus likely to be taxed. 3 We then calculated the implied tax paid by households in the EPM based on those rates and the total expenditures for each good in the survey and aggregated this information to the industries in the IO table. Finally, we calculated the "average statutory rate" as the sum of all tax payments in the industry for the tax in question divided by households' total expenditures in the same industry.
The "average actual rate" is the ratio of the total amount of a given tax paid in each industry divided by the total demand (total resources) for that industry. This information comes entirely from the IO table and national income accounts.
The "IO effective rate" is the sum of the change in the value of domestic production (by industry) due to a change in the "average actual rate" plus the change in the value of imports due to the tax change, all divided by the total demand for that industry. By the nature of the multiplier calculations, these rates are all larger than the "average actual rates," because they include those rates plus any indirect effects of the tax on other industry through the IO table.
In general, the actual taxes collected per industry are substantially lower than the statutory rates that YSHD assumed, 4 a standard observation in developing countries. This means that our own tax calculations will differ significantly from YSHD's. Further, comparison of the average actual with the IO-effective tax rates shows that the latter are much higher, so that the indirect effects of taxes that are passed through the I-O table is important. This, too, will give us results that differ from YSHD. It is also interesting to note that the VAT shows a substantial amount of cascading (noted by comparing the two right columns). This probably is due to the importance of the industries that are exempted, but not zero-rated.
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Dominance Results
Figures 1 through 5 show concentration curves for the major taxes paid in Madagascar, for three different methods. The first is the "standard" method of YSHD. The second is similar 3 See Appendix I for details of the assumptions and calculations. 4 The exceptions are cases where YSHD assumed a zero tax rate because the household survey did not ask about consumption of any product in that industry . 5 Gottfried and Wiegard discuss the difference between exemptions, in which an industry does not pay VAT, but does not receive a refund for the VAT already paid by its suppliers, and zero-rating, where the rebates are received. Exemptions are much more common, but they do imply that "exempted" products still include some taxes. Further, they allow cascading, since purchases from exempted sectors do not include any VAT credit, but there may in fact be some tax included in the costs.
to the first, but rather than using statutory rates, it uses estimates of the effective tax rate based on the taxes actually paid, as indicated in the I-O There are, nonetheless, some notable differences. One of these, for tobacco taxes, highlights a weakness in the approach that we take in this paper. While our I-O table includes an industry for tobacco, it does not disaggregate between cigarettes, which are taxed and mostly consumed by the better off, and Parakay, which not taxed and is mostly consumed by the poor.
When we aggregate these two products into one industry, the resulting incidence is a combination of the distribution of cigarette and parakay consumption, with the latter diluting the progressive impact of the tobacco excise. YSHD, because they rely only on the household survey, are able to keep these consumption items separate and thus find (more accurately, in this case) that the tobacco excise is progressive.
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The other two outstanding differences in concentration curves by method are for import duties and petroleum taxes. It is important to note, however, that the reason for the differences appears not to be from the indirect effects of taxes on one intermediate product passing through the I-O table to different final products, but rather from the difference between statutory and effective rates of taxation, as seen in Table 1 . In fact, the effective tax and I-O tax methods produce very similar concentration curves in both cases, indicating that the latter differs from the standard method only because it uses effective tax rate estimates, not because of cascading of taxes through the structure of production. Thus, as a methodological point, it seems more important to get accurate information on the actual taxes that a product is likely to pay than to worry about the indirect effects that taxes might have because they affect some producers input prices. Surprisingly, this is true even for two important productive inputs, petroleum and intermediate imports.
These conclusions are born out in the statistical tests. Tables 2 to 5 show results of dominance tests for the different taxes. For each tax, no concentration curve derived using effective tax rates differs statistically from the corresponding concentration curve derived using the I-O methods. Thus, while it would seem to be important in theory, the indirect effect that taxes have on downstream producers makes little difference to the incidence of a tax in Madagascar. Further, for all taxes except import duties and tobacco, where the aggregation of two different products leads to imprecise results, even the simplest methods used on YSHD produce results similar to the more elaborate ones found here. Thus, even though those methods appear vulnerable to criticism in theory, in practice, the methods do not perform badly.
A practical consequence of this correspondence between different methods' results is that the policy implications in this paper are similar to those in YSHD. Tables 6 shows dominance test results for the major taxes in Madagascar when taxes are calculated using YSHD's methods. Table 7 gives the same results for the I-O based methods of this paper. In both cases, the vanilla duty has the lowest gini coefficient, but its strongly s-shaped concentration curve means that it crosses most other taxes' concentration curves, and statistically dominates none. 8 For the standard method (Table 6 ), all taxes are progressive, and the same is true for all taxes except tobacco excises for the I-O method (Table 7) . But again, we have every reason to believe that tobacco's concentration curve is too high because the I-O methods force us to aggregate cigarettes and parakay.
Among individual taxes, the only strong difference between the YSHD and I-O table results is in regards to import duties. Using the standard method, YSHD found that import duties were more regressive than other taxes in Madagascar, and we reproduce that result here. 9 For the I-O methods, however, import duties are substantially more progressive, and no tax dominates them. In fact, with the exception of tobacco, who's results are doubtful, the test provide no clear evidence that one or the other tax is more progressive, except that, as in YSHD, taxes on wages are by far the most progressive, dominating all others.
Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to examine the relative progressivity of different taxes in 10 This forces us to aggregate the very detailed information from the EPM into broad classes that, in turn, obscures some of the distributional consequences of taxation. We have seen, for example, that this papers finds tobacco taxes to be less progressive than YSHD, but that is because it has aggregated cigarettes (mostly consumed by wealthier households) and parakay into one industry. In Madagascar, the tobacco tax falls only on cigarettes, but when we apply it to the tobacco industry in the I-O table, we actual apply it to all tobacco products, including parakay. This makes the taxation appear less progressive than it actually is.
The same problem exists for petroleum taxation. While the EPM includes information on kerosene, diesel, and gasoline purchases separately, and thus permits an analysis of the (quite different) incidence of each product, the I-O table includes only one industry, forcing us to consider all petroleum taxes as on package.
Thus, in the end, the innovation that this paper offers has not been terribly useful. On the one hand, its results are reasonably similar to YSHDs. On the other, its higher order of product aggregation has led to a misleading conclusion (for tobacco), or an inability to draw conclusions (for specific petroleum products). The one genuinely interesting result the incidence of some taxes, especially import duties, changes substantially when we use actual taxes collected rather than the statutory tax rates to estimate how much households that consume imported goods pay in taxes. This suggests that future research should attempt to obtain estimates of how much tax is actually paid rather than using statutory tax rates.
10 Of course, it is possible in theory to build very large, detailed, I-O tables to avoid this problem. But in practice in Africa, that is not the norm.
Appendix I -Assumed statutory tax rates from YSHD, and and I-O table industry assignments for products in the ECM
This appendix details the assumptions that YSHD used to calculate tax payments for the households in the ECM. To estimate the tax base for each tax, we have assumed that:
1) the VAT is levied on the CIF value of imports plus all import duties paid; 2) import duties and tariffs are levied on the CIF value of imports; 3) commodity-specific excises are levied on the CIF value of imports (if the goods are imported) or the value of domestic sales ; 4) there is an untaxed retail markup on all expenditure items.
We then apply the rate shown in the table to the calculated base. We calculate the retail markup from a 1995 input-output table for Madagascar, using the ratio of retail and wholesale services to the sum of domestic sales plus imports. We then use the appropriate industry's ratio for each product in the expenditure survey. Results for single-item taxes are not sensitive to errors in the percentages we use because the concentration curves are calculated as ratios. However, for multi-item taxes (import duties and the VAT), errors across items with different tax rates could change the incidence calculations.
The only other indirect tax we examine is the vanilla export duty. We apply the duty rate (25 percent) to each household's sales of vanilla (in FMG) to estimate their tax payments for vanilla exports. Note that this assumes that farmers only pay a part of the total duty, equal to their share in the total FOB price of vanilla, i.e., they share the tax incidence with middlemen who buy their vanilla output and sell it to the vanilla marketing board. As with the expenditure taxes, this will not affect the concentration curve for vanilla duties, but probably underestimates the nominal amount that farmers pay.
The only direct tax included in this report is the income tax on wages. We have assumed that only workers who work for the public sector or for formal enterprises pay income taxes on their wages and benefits (question 13, section 4, part B responds 1 or 2, and analogously for other jobs). In contrast to the expenditure taxes, we use the 1994 tax tables to be consistent with the nominal value of salaries earned in those years. items, we have used 10 percent of the value of the items owned, found in section 11, part B, rather than the expenditure information in section 8. 2/ For transport, we assume that 20 percent of the cost is due to taxes on pet deroleum products. 3/ Includes wheat in bread. 4/There was no excise tax on kerosene in 1994. In order to say somet dehing about the incidence of the kerosene duty that came later we have used the 1996 duty per liter, deflated by the proportion that the gasoline duty increased from 1994 to 1996. Source: Calculated from Government of Madagascar (1994). 
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